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SECURITIES LAW
Does SEC Rule 1O-b5 Provide an Implied Private
Right of Action for Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud?
by Matthew J. Barrett
Central Bank of Denver, N.A.
V.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.
and Jack K. Naber
(Docket No. 92-854)
Argument Date: November 30, 1993
From: The Tenth Circuit
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. 78j(b) ("Section 10(b)"), and
Securities and Exchange Commission
Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 Case at
("Rule lOb-5"), prohibit securities
fraud. Section 10(b) provides: 7 his case co
It shall be unlawful for any I ty of pers
person, directly or indirectly, by T securities
the use of any means or instru- federal law. Firs
mentality of interstate com- will decide if feder
merce or of the mails, or any nizes an implied
facility of any national securities against those who
exchange- fraud. Second, ii
(b) To use or employ, in con- that there is a priv
nection with the purchase or sale asked to decide if
of any security registered on a the mental-state re
national securities exchange or courts have held
any security not so registered, imposing civil liab
any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Rule lob-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirect-
ly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any nation-
al securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
Matthew J. Barrett is associate professor of law at Notre Dame
Law School, Notre Dame, IN 46556; telephone (219) 631-
8121.
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
ISSUES
1. Do Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 provide an implied private
right of action for aiding and abetting violations of those pro-
visions?
2. If so, does recklessness satisfy the
mental-state requirement for aiding
and abetting Section 10(b) and
Rule lob-5 violations when the
alleged aider and abettor has not
breached a duty to disclose or to
act?
FACTS
In 1988, Central Bank of Denver,
N.A. ("Central") served as bond
trustee when the Colorado Springs-
Stetson Hills Public Building
Authority (the "Authority") sold $11
million in tax-exempt municipal
bonds to finance public improvements
in a planned residential and commer-
cial community in Colorado Springs
called Stetson Hills. The Authority
pledged land in the development to secure the bonds and agreed
that the collateral would at all times have an appraised value at
least equal to 160 percent of the bonds' outstanding principal
and interest. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. ("First
Interstate") purchased $2.1 million of the bonds, later selling
some of the bonds to various customers, including Jack K.
Naber.
Central previously served as trustee for a 1986 issuance of
similar bonds. Before the 1988 bonds were issued, Central
received an updated appraisal covering both the land securing
the 1986 bonds and the separate parcels which the Authority
proposed as security for the 1988 bonds.
The updated appraisal showed land values essentially
unchanged from a 1986 appraisal, even though local real estate
values had declined in the interim. Subsequently, the lead
underwriter for the 1986 bonds notified Central that the collat-
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eral's value did not satisfy the 160 percent test and expressed
concern that the 1988 appraisal was unreliable. Central's own
investigation raised similar concerns.
As trustee for the 1986 bonds, Central requested that a dif-
ferent appraiser conduct an independent review of the updated
appraisal. After meetings with the Authority, the developer, and
others, Central agreed to defer the independent review until late
1988, at least six months after the Authority planned to sell the
1988 bonds. As a condition for Central's agreement, the devel-
oper agreed to pledge an additional $2 million in property to
secure the 1986 bonds. However, neither the Authority nor the
developer actually pledged any additional property as security
for the 1988 bonds, which the Authority sold as scheduled in
June 1988 without a new appraisal of the collateral. The
Authority later refused to complete the promised independent
review and, ultimately, defaulted on the 1988 bonds.
In response to the default, Naber and First Interstate sued
Central Bank and others, alleging that the sale of the 1988
bonds violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Naber and First
Interstate alleged that Central knowingly or recklessly aided
and abetted the fraud by withdrawing its demand for an imme-
diate independent review of the updated appraisal in the face of
its concerns about the appraisal's accuracy and by agreeing to
delay the review until after the Authority had sold the 1988
bonds.
In an unpublished order, the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado held that recklessness could not satisfy
the mental-state requirement for aiding and abetting liability
unless the alleged aider and abettor also had a duty to disclose
information. Because the district court could not find any gen-
uine issue of material fact as to Central's knowledge or duty to
disclose, the court granted Central's motion for summary judg-
ment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
reversed, holding that a plaintiff could establish aiding and
abetting liability based on recklessness even though the alleged
aider and abettor had no duty to disclose, so long as the defen-
dant's "affirmative action" assisted the primary violation. 969
F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1992).
The Supreme Court granted Central's petition for a writ of
certiorari on the question of whether recklessness satisfies the
mental-state requirement to impose civil liability for aiding and
abetting, even though the alleged aider and abettor has not
breached a duty to disclose or act. In addition, the Court direct-
ed the parties to brief and argue whether there is an implied pri-
vate right of action for aiding and abetting violations of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Implied Cause of Action
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 prohibit manipulative or
deceptive devices or contrivances that operate to mislead
investors in connection with the purchase or sale of any securi-
ty through the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, the mails, or any national securities exchange.
Neither Section 10(b) nor Rule lOb-5, however, create an
express private right of action for violations. In this context, a
private right of action means that a private, nongovernmental
party can file a lawsuit alleging violations of Section 10(b) or
Rule lOb-5.
Beginning with Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), the lower federal courts have con-
cluded that Section 10(b) allows a private right of action by
implication, reasoning, in part, that such private remedies rein-
force federal statutory duties. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); Musick, Peeler & Garrett v.
Employers Ins., 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2088 (1993).
In 1971, the Supreme Court seemed to acquiesce in the pri-
vate right of action for primary violations of Section 10(b).
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S.
6, 13 n.9 (1971); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560, 577-79 n.19 (1979). Twelve years later, the Supreme
Court left no doubt, observing that "[t]he existence of this
implied remedy is simply beyond peradventure." Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 & n.10 (1983).
In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether a private
cause of action exists for aiding and abetting violations of
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. In two previous cases, Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 191 n.7 (1976), and Herman
& MacLean, 459 U.S. at 379 n.5, the Court reserved the ques-
tion of whether the statute and rule impose civil liability for aid-
ing and abetting and also reserved the question of the elements
necessary to establish such liability.
At least since Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co.,
259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), and 286 F. Supp. 702 (1968),
affd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989
(1970), the lower federal courts have unanimously concluded
that there is a private right of action for aiding and abetting secu-
rities fraud in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Interestingly, Central did not raise this issue in the lower
courts or in its petition for a writ of certiorari because the Tenth
Circuit, like the other courts of appeals that have considered the
question, had previously recognized a private right of action for
aiding and abetting under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
However, several lower courts have questioned and criticized
the creation of an implied private right of action in the aiding
and abetting context. Akin v. Q-L Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d
521, 525 (5th Cir. 1992); Renovitch v. Kaufman, 905 F.2d
1040, 1045 n.7 (7th Cir. 1990). In granting Central's petition
for a writ of certiorari on the question of recklessness, the
Supreme Court directed the parties to brief and argue whether
there is an implied private right of action for aiding and abetting
violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
As a practical matter, the private right of action for aiding
and abetting recognized by the lower federal courts has enabled
investors to recover from various professionals and business
entities that have rendered services in connection with transac-
tions involving securities fraud. These professionals and busi-
ness entities - accountants, lawyers, appraisers, geologists,
engineers, actuaries, banks and rating agencies - often are
instrumental to securities transactions. But, while important,
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they do not actually buy and sell securities and usually do not
have a fiduciary relationship with those people who do.
Without aiding and abetting liability, investors might not be
able to recover losses in securities fraud cases from these
ancillary, but necessary, actors in securities transactions. In
essence, the issue in this case becomes whether the implied
private right of action applies only to defendants that engage
in manipulative, deceptive, or fraudulent acts or goes farther
to reach defendants that assist others, whether through
action or inaction, in such conduct.
Central argues that the implied private right of action for
aiding and abetting conflicts with the language in Section
10(b) which proscribes only manipulative or deceptive con-
duct. Central also argues that the courts that have recognized
a private right of action for aiding and abetting violations of
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 have improperly applied tort
law concepts to securities law. Central asserts that in recent
years the Supreme Court has rejected application of general
tort law principles to create implied private rights of action
under the federal securities laws.
In contrast, First Interstate and Naber argue that neither
Section 10(b) nor Rule lOb-5 make any distinction between
primary violations and secondary, i.e., aiding and abetting,
violations of the statute or the rule. In their opinion, the
comprehensive language in Section 10(b) that "[i]t shall be
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly," to engage in
the prohibited conduct underscores that the statute applies to
a broad class of defendants. They also argue that since the
prohibitions in Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 have given rise
to criminal aiding and abetting liability, the Supreme Court
should not interpret the provisions to immunize aiders and
abettors from civil liability.
Recklessness
If the Supreme Court concludes that Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 provide an implied private right of action for
aiding and abetting violations, the Court must determine
whether recklessness satisfies the mental-state requirement
which the lower courts have adopted as a prerequisite for
imposing aiding and abetting liability.
Lower courts agree that a plaintiff must prove that the
defendant possessed scienter, i.e., "a mental state embracing
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Ernst & Ernst,
425 U.S. at 194 n.12. On this element, a majority of lower
courts have concluded that recklessness satisfies the scienter
requirement for aiding and abetting violations of Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
Relying in large part upon Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc.,
950 F.2d 1478, 1483-85 (9th Cir. 1991), the Tenth Circuit in
this case held that recklessness satisfies the scienter require-
ment even though the alleged aider and abettor has not
breached a duty to disclose or act, if that person has taken
"affirmative action" that assists the primary violation of
these provisions. 969 F.2d at 902-03. However, the Tenth
Circuit's holding conflicts with decisions in the Second,
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Fourth, and Eighth Circuits which have held that reckless-
ness does not establish scienter unless the alleged aider and
abettor also breached a duty. Ross v. Bolton, 904 F.2d 819,
824 (2d Cir. 1990); Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 496
(4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992); Camp
v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 462 (8th Cir. 1991).
Other courts of appeals use different tests. The Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits have adopted a "sliding scale" approach
under which the requisite degree of scienter varies depend-
ing upon whether the alleged aider and abettor breached a
duty to disclose and upon the nature of the defendant's con-
duct. Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 95-97 (5th Cir.
1975); Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1009-11
( lIth Cir. 1985).
The Seventh Circuit imposes the most restrictive test, requir-
ing, at a minimum, that the alleged aider and abettor (1) commit
a "manipulative or deceptive" act which Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 prohibit and (2) satisfy the same scienter requirement
necessary for primary liability. Robin v. Arthur Young & Co.,
915 F.2d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 923
(1991). On the issue of scienter, this case enables the Court to
reconcile these conflicting views.
The standard used to establish scienter can be critical in
determining civil liability for aiding and abetting. As a gen-
eral rule, a recklessness standard is easier for a plaintiff to
prove than a conscious-intent standard.
Central contends that the operative language in Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 indicates that the provisions prohibit
only conduct committed with actual knowledge of the secu-
rities fraud. Central also asserts that the recklessness stan-
dard creates uncertainty because it borders on negligence
which, the Supreme Court has held, cannot establish scien-
ter for a primary violation of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
First Interstate and Naber argue that a recklessness stan-
dard operates to discourage deliberate ignorance, especially
in cases in which the defendant has affirmatively acted to
assist the primary violation. Moreover, because the victims
of fraud could recover tort damages for reckless conduct
when Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Congress designed the federal securities laws to
offer more protection to investors, they argue that a reck-
lessness standard for aiding and abetting liability advances
Congressional intent.
If the Supreme Court determines that recklessness does
not establish scienter for aiding and abetting liability, the
Court need not reach the issue of whether recklessness
would suffice to establish the requisite scienter for a prima-
ry violation under Section 10(b) or Rule lOb-5. On two pre-
vious occasions, the Court has reserved that question. Aaron
v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 446 U.S. 680, 686 n.5
(1980); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 194 n.12. If the Court
holds that recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement for
aiding and abetting liability, its holding may imply that
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